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Abstract
This paper proposes tests of policy ine¤ectiveness in the context of macroeconometric
rational expectations models. It is assumed that there is a policy intervention that takes the
form of changes in the parameters of a policy rule, and that there are su¢ cient observations
before and after the intervention. The test is based on the di¤erence between the realisations
of the outcome variable of interest and counterfactuals based on no policy intervention, using
only the pre-intervention parameter estimates, and in consequence the Lucas Critique does not
apply. The paper develops tests of policy ine¤ectiveness for a full structural model, with and
without exogenous, policy or non-policy, variables. Asymptotic distributions of the proposed
tests are derived both when the post intervention sample is xed as the pre-intervention sample
expands, and when both samples rise jointly but at di¤erent rates. The performance of the
test is illustrated by a simulated policy analysis of a three equation New Keynesian Model,
which shows that the test size is correct but the power may be low unless the model includes
exogenous variables, or if the policy intervention changes the steady states, such as the ination
target.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose tests for the e¤ect of a change in policy on some target variable in the
context of a macroeconometric dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We are
concerned with ex post evaluation of a policy intervention on a single unit (country), where data
are available before and after the intervention.
We consider a policy intervention which takes the form of a change in one or more of the
parameters of a policy rule, the non-policy parameters being structural in that they are invariant
to the policy intervention. The announcement and implementation of the intervention, at time
T0; are assumed to be understood and to be credible. The null hypothesis of the test is policy
ine¤ectiveness, no change in the parameters, and the tests are based on the mean, over a given
policy evaluation horizon, T0+1; T0+2; :::; T0+H; of the di¤erences between the post-intervention
realizations of the target variable and the associated counterfactual outcomes based on the para-
meters estimated using data before the policy intervention. The development of the test does not
require knowing or estimating the post-intervention parameters, thus it is not a structural change
test. We derive the asymptotic distribution of the tests both when the post-intervention sample
size, H; is xed as the pre-intervention sample expands, and when both samples rise jointly but
possibly at di¤erent rates.
The Lucas Critique is not an issue since the counterfactual, given by the predictions from
the model estimated on pre-intervention data, will embody pre-intervention parameters while the
actual post-intervention outcomes will embody the e¤ect of any change in the policy parameters
and the consequent change in expectations. Di¤erent issues are involved in ex ante policy for-
mulation where post-intervention data are not available and the Lucas Critique could be an issue
since the possible e¤ects of the policy change on parameters and expectations must be taken into
account.
We consider both standard DSGE models where all variables, including policy variables, are
endogenous and DSGE models augmented by exogenous variables. This also accommodates inter-
ventions that change parameters in rules that determine the policy variable exogenously, as in a
xed money supply growth rule or ination targeting, rather than determine them endogenously,
as in a Taylor rule that relates the policy variable to the endogenous variables of the DSGE model.
Thus our framework can also accommodate policy changes that alter the steady states of some of
the variables, as occurs when the ination target is changed.
In DSGE models with persistence, we show that the policy intervention will e¤ect the devia-
tions from steady state but these e¤ects are transitory, so the average e¤ect of the intervention on
the target variable over the evaluation sample will fall towards zero as the length of the evaluation
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sample is increased without bound. Thus while the test may have power for short post-intervention
evaluation samples, its power does not rise with H. In addition, the power of the test to detect
the intervention will depend on the state of the economy at the time of the intervention, T0: If
at T0 the economy is in steady states the test will have little power to detect the intervention.
In practice this may not be a problem, because major policy interventions tend to take place at
times when the economy is far from its steady state.
Where there are exogenous variables that have permanent e¤ects or where the policy interven-
tion changes the steady state, such as changing the target rate of ination, the power of the test
increases towards one as the evaluation horizon, H; increases. The most e¤ective policy changes
are ones that change the parameters in a way that amplies the permanent e¤ect of exogenous
variables. Policy interventions that change the steady states, such as the target ination rate,
have this property.
We investigate the size and power of the proposed tests by a simulation analysis using a
standard three equation New Keynesian DSGE model, where the policy interventions involve
changing the parameters of the Taylor rule. The model shows very standard shock impulse
response functions which show the time prole of the e¤ects on the variables of monetary policy,
demand and supply shocks. We also consider policy impulse response functions which show
the time prole of the e¤ects on the variables of a change in the policy rule parameters. The
simulations accord with the theoretical results and show that in all applications (where we abstract
from parameter uncertainty) the tests have the correct size; but if the intervention does not
change the steady state the power of the test can be low. The simulations demonstrate how the
power varies with the the magnitude of the policy change, the di¤erence between pre and post-
intervention parameter values; the particular parameters of the Taylor rule which are changed;
the state of the economy at the time of policy intervention, and the post-intervention evaluation
horizon.
We also consider policy changes that aim at increasing or reducing the ination target, with
the latter scenario being currently of interest for Japan. Once again simulation results are in line
with the theory, and show that our test has power when it is applied to interest rates and ination
and the power rises with H and eventually appraoches unity. But when the test is applied to
output deviations, the power could be low and does not rise with H, since the e¤ect of the policy
change on output is only transitory. The simulations also show interesting interactions between
the direction of the policy change in the ination target and the degree of interest rate smoothing.
In cases where the policy change aims at increasing the ination target then smoothing of interest
rate changes can have benecial e¤ects on output, but in cases where the ination target is reduced
further smoothing of interest rate changes can be costly as output losses will be greater.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the counterfactuals and policy
impulse response functions and derives the policy ine¤ectiveness test for a standard DSGE where
all the variables, including the policy variable, are endogenous. Section 3 augments the standard
DSGE model to allow for exogenous variables including exogenous policy variables. Section 4
provides the simulated policy analysis of the New Keynesian model. Section 5 ends with some
concluding remarks. The more technical derivations are given in an Appendix.
2 Policy ine¤ectiveness tests for a standard RE model
2.1 Derivation of the counterfactuals and policy e¤ects: standard case
Consider a standard rational expectations (RE) model, where all the variables are endogenous.
We suppose that the target variable, yt; is a¤ected directly by a vector of variables, zt, including
the policy variable, and assume that the (kz + 1)  1 vector qt = (yt; z0t)0 is determined by the
RE model (which could result from some well dened decision problem) of the form
A0qt = A1Et(qt+1) +A2qt 1 + ut; (1)
where the structural shocks, ut, have mean zero, E(ut) = 0; are serially uncorrelated and have the
constant variance matrix, E(utu0t) = u; typically a diagonal matrix. Et(qt+1) = E(qt+1 j It);
It is the information set that includes ut, and the lagged values of the variables, qt. We assume
that qt are measured as deviations from their steady state values, but discuss policy changes that
alter the steady states, such as the ination target, below.
Initially we abstract from parameter estimation uncertainty and denote the vector of structural
and policy parameters by  = vec(A0;A1;A2), and assume that u remains invariant to the
policy change. The parameter vector, , is composed of a set of policy parameters, p, and a
set of structural parameters, s, that are invariant to changes in p. A policy intervention is
dened in terms of a change in one or more elements of p. The null hypothesis of our test is
policy ine¤ectiveness to be dened more formally below. We assume that the model is known
by economic agents, the announcement and implementation of the intervention are credible, and
no further changes are expected.1 We suppose that the policy intervention occurs at the end of
time t = T0, and we have a pre-intervention sample that runs from t = M;M + 1; :::; T0, and
a post-intervention sample for t = T0 + 1; T0 + 2; ::; T0 + H. Therefore, the post-intervention
evaluation horizon is H and the sample size for estimation of the pre-intervention parameters is
T = T0  M + 1: This notation allows us to increase the sample size T (by letting M !  1),
while keeping the time of intervention, T0, xed.
1Kulish and Pagan (2014) consider solutions of forward looking models in the case of imperfect credibility where
policy announcements are not necessarily incorporated into expectations.
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A prominent example of a system of this form is the three equation new Keynesian DSGE
model, which has an IS curve determining log output-gap, yt; a Phillips curve determining in-
ation, t; and a Taylor rule determining the short interest rate, Rt: The policy parameters are
the parameters of the Taylor rule. We use such a model in the simulation analysis in Section 4.
In the literature the e¤ects of policy is usually measured by "shock impulse response functions",
SIRFs. For instance in the NK model, this estimates the expected e¤ect over time of a one stan-
dard error monetary policy shock to the interest rate equation, assuming that the shock is small
enough to leave the parameters unchanged. In contrast, we focus on a "policy impulse response
function" (PIRF), that measures the e¤ect over time of a policy intervention that takes the form
of a change in the policy parameters, p, such as those of the Taylor rule, rather than a shock
to its equation error. In the context of the SIRF, it is often not clear what is the source of this
policy implementation error that is shocked to produce the IRF in response to a monetary policy
shock.
Under the above set up, the RE model (1) has the unique solution
qt = ()qt 1 +  ()ut; (2)
if the quadratic matrix equation
A1
2  A0+A2 = 0; (3)
has a solution, , with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle, and  () = (A0  A1) 1. Below
we shall also use the reduced form shocks, "t =  ()ut, and we note that
"() = E("t"
0
t) = (A0  A1) 1u(A0  A1)
0 1: (4)
Notice that (2) is a vector autoregression and corresponds to the reduced form of a standard
simultaneous equations model where there are no exogenous variables.
A policy change, dened as a change in one or more elements of p; will a¤ect the mean
outcomes through changes in() and the variance of the outcomes through  (). Denote the pre-
intervention parameters by 0 = (00p ; 0s)0, and the post-intervention parameters by 1 = (10p ; 0s)0,
where only one or more elements of the policy parameters are changed. If the intervention at
T0 is transparently and fully communicated, it is understood to be credible, with expectations
adjusting immediately, then the process switches from
qt = (
0)qt 1 +  (0)ut; t =M;M + 1;M + 2; :::; T0
to
qt = (
1)qt 1 +  (1)ut; t = T0 + 1; T0 + 2; :::; T0 +H:
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The policy impulse response function for yt is given by the expected di¤erence in the outcomes
associated with the two parameter vectors
PIRFy(h; 
0; 1;qT0) = s
0
n

 
1
h     0hoqT0 ; (5)
where s is a the (kz + 1) 1 selection vector with all its elements zero except for its rst element
which is set to unity. Unlike the shock impulse response functions the PIRF depends on the state
of the economy at the time of the intervention, qT0 : To evaluate this PIRF requires knowing, or
being able to estimate, the post-intervention parameters 1. However, the counterfactual values
of the focus variable, yT0+h, on the assumption of no change in policy, are given by
y0T0+h = s
0   0h qT0 ; (6)
and only require estimation of 0. The e¤ect of policy on the target variable is then the di¤erence
between the realised values, yT0+h; and the counterfactual values, y
0
T0+h
,
dT0+h = yT0+h   y0T0+h; h = 1; 2; :::;H: (7)
These measured policy e¤ects will be subject to the post intervention random errors, "y;T0+h::
Notice that if there are no dynamics in (1), A2 = 0; then assuming that all eigenvalues of
A 10 A1 lie within the unit circle, the unique solution is:
qt = A
 1
0 ut =  ()ut:
Thus in the absence of persistence (dynamics), a policy intervention (dened by a change in some
elements of A0) has no e¤ect on the mean outcomes, qt; but does change the variance of the
outcomes. The variance of qt changes from "(0) =  (0)u (0)0 to "(1) =  (1)u (1)0.
Conditional on the structural error variances, u, remaining constant, one could derive a test
statistic for a policy induced variance change corresponding to the policy ine¤ectiveness test for a
mean change discussed below. It will be more challenging to develop tests that separate the e¤ects
of a policy change from other changes in u that happen by chance. When there is persistence,
policy can e¤ect mean outcomes, but that e¤ect is transitory since the system returns to steady
state.
2.2 Derivation of the test statistic: standard case
To derive the distribution of the policy e¤ects and develop a policy ine¤ectiveness test we require
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The RE model dened by (1) has a unique solution given by (2), and
the structural parameters,  2 , are identied at 0 and 1 (the pre and post-intervention
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parameters). The structural errors, ut, are serially uncorrelated with zero means and a constant
covariance matrix, u.
Assumption 2a: The spectral radius of (), dened by jmax [()]j, is strictly less than
unity for values of  = 0 and 1 2 .2
Assumption 2b: There exists a matrix norm of(), denoted by k()k, such that k()k <
1, for values of  = 0 and 1 2 .
Assumption 3: Standard regularity assumptions on the structural errors, ut, and the
processes generating the exogenous variables (if any) apply such that 0 can be consistently
estimated by ^
0
T based on the pre-intervention sample, t = M;M + 1;M + 2; :::; T0, where
T = T0  M + 1; and ^0T = 0 +Op
 
T 1=2

. In particular
p
T

^0T   0

as N(0;0); (8)
E
^0T   0 = O(T 1=2); (9)
where 0 is a symmetric positive denite matrix.
Assumption 4: () = (ij()), is bounded and continuously di¤erentiable in , such that@ij()=@0, for all i and j exist and are bounded.
Assumption 5: The initial values, qT0 , are bounded, namely kqT0k < K; where K is a xed
positive constant.
Assumptions 1, 2a, 3 and 4 are standard in the literature on the econometric analysis of DSGE
models. The conditions for identication in Assumption 1 are discussed in Koop, Pesaran and
Smith (2013). Assumption 2a ensures that k()k < , where  is a nite positive constant.3
Assumption 2b is stronger than 2a and further requires that  < 1. This latter restriction allows
us to simplify the proofs considerably and obtain the main theoretical results without requiring
high order di¤erentiability of () which will be needed in the absence of Assumption 2b.
In the cases where both H and T go to innity we will also use the following joint asymptotic
condition:
Condition 1 The post-intervention sample size, H, rises with the pre-intervention sample size,
T , such that H = T , where  is a xed positive constant, and   1=2.
Using (6), estimates of the counterfactuals in the absence of the policy change are given by
y^0T0+h = s
0
h


^0T
ih
qT0 ; (10)
2max(A) stands for the largest eigenvalue of matrix A.
3Note that there exists a matrix norm, kAk, such that jmax(A)j  kAk  jmax(A)j + , where  is a positive
constant. See, for example, Lemma 5.10.10 in Horn and Johnson (1985).
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where under Assumption 3, ^0T is a
p
T - consistent estimator of  based on the pre-intervention
sample. Therefore, the estimated policy e¤ects are given by
d^T0+h(^
0
T ) = s
0qT0+h   s0
h


^0T
ih
qT0 ; (11)
for h = 1; 2; :::;H. It is clear that estimation of the policy e¤ects only requires estimates of 0
that can be obtained using the pre-intervention sample. Also, the sampling distribution of the
d^T0+h(^
0
T ), depends on post-intervention parameters only under the alternative that the policy is
e¤ective, but not under the null hypothesis of no policy e¤ect as dened by
H0 : 
1 = 0: (12)
To derive the distribution of the policy e¤ects, d^T0+h(^
0
T ); rst note that post-intervention
realized values, qT0+h, (for h = 1; 2; :::;H) are given by
qT0+h =


 
1
h
qT0 +
h 1X
j=0


 
1
j
 (1)uT0+h j . (13)
Using (13) and substituting the results for qT0+h in (11) we have
d^T0+h(^
0
T ) = ^T0;h(^
0
T ) + vT0;h (14)
where
^T0;h(^
0
T ) =  s0
h


^0T
ih     1hqT0 ; (15)
vT0;h =
h 1X
j=0
s0


 
1
j
 (1)uT0+h j ; (16)
In (14) the estimated policy e¤ect, d^T0+h(^
0
T ), has a systematic component, ^T0;h(^
0
T ), and a
random component, vT0;h. The random component is a weighted linear combination of serially
uncorrelated shocks, ut with the weights decaying exponentially under Assumption 2a. A policy
ine¤ectiveness test of H0 can now be based on the policy e¤ects, d^T0+h(^
0
T ), h = 1; 2; :::;H. But
to develop formal statistical tests of policy ine¤ectiveness, we also need to make distributional
assumptions regarding the shocks, ut. The role of such assumptions can be minimized by basing
the policy ine¤ectiveness test on a "mean policy e¤ect" computed over the post-intervention
horizon T0 + h, for h = 1; 2; :::;H, namely
d^H(^
0
T ) =
1
H
HX
h=1
d^T0+h(^
0
T ): (17)
For a xed H, the implicit null hypothesis of no policy e¤ects can now be specied as
H 00 : p lim
T!1
 
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T )
!
= 0: (18)
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As we shall see, this condition is met under Assumptions 1, 2a, 3 and 4 when H is xed and as
T !1.
Interestingly enough, H 00 continues to hold even if H ! 1, so long as Assumption 2b holds
and the rate of increase of H in relation to T is governed by the joint asymptotic condition 1. If
the underlying RE model is correctly specied, then under the null of no policy change, H0, we
have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T ) =  s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h


^0T
ih     0h)qT0 : (19)
Now using results in Lemmas 2 and 3, given in the Appendix, we haveH 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T )
  s0 kqT0kH 1=2

HX
h=1
h


^0T
ih     0h
 K s0 kqT0kH 1=2
 
HX
h=1
hh 1T
!^0T   0 ; (20)
where K is a xed constant. Using (70) in Lemma 3, we have(^0T )  (0)+ aT ^0T   0 ;
where aT =
@  0T  =@0, and elements of 0T lie on the line segment joining 0 and ^0T . Con-
sidering that 0T !p 0, and by Assumption 4 k@ij()=@0k for all i and j exist and are bounded,
then it must also follow that aT is bounded in T . Hence, recalling that under Assumption 3,p
T
^0T   0 = Op(1), then T   + aTT 1=2, where   0  , and aT is bounded in T .
In the case where H is xed and T !1,H 1=2
 
HX
h=1
hh 1T
!  H 1=2
HX
h=1
h

+ aTT
 1=2
h 1 ! H 1=2 HX
h=1
hh 1 < K, as T !1.
Using this result in (20) and noting that under Assumptions 3 and 5, kqT0k is bounded in T;
and
^0T   0 = Op  T 1=2, then under the null of no policy change, H0, for a xed H and as
T !1, we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T )
!p 0, as required.
Consider now the case where H rises with T and the rate of increase of H in relation to T is
governed by the joint asymptotic condition 1. Note also that under Assumption 2b,  < 1. Then
using (71) and (72) in Lemma 4 we have
HX
h=1
hh 1T =
1
(1  )2 +Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

; (21)
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T =
1
(1  )2

H   1 + 
1  

+Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

: (22)
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Using (21) in (20), and (22) we obtain
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T ) = Op

H 1=2T 1=2

+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
; under H0 (23)
Therefore, under H0; H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T ) tends to zero in probability if H = T
, for   1=2; as
H and T !1 (the joint asymptotic condition 1).
To derive the distribution of d^H(^0T ); using Lemma 1, in the Appendix, we rst note that
1
H
HX
h=1
vT0;h =
1
H
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0

(1)
j
 (1)uT0+h j =
1
H
HX
j=1
s0AH j (1) (1)uT0+h j ; (24)
where
AH j (1) = Ikz+1 +1 +21 + :::+H j1 = (Ikz+1 1) 1 (Ikz+1 H j+11 ): (25)
To simplify notation we have used 1 for (1). Considering that under H0, ^T0;H(^
0
T ) =
Op(T
 1=2), we have
V ar
p
Hd^H(^
0
T )

= !20q + o(1);
where
!20q = s
0
24H 1 HX
j=1
AH j (1)"(1)A0H j (1)
35 s;
"(
1) = E("T+j"
0
T+j) =  (
1)u (
1)0. See (4) for the denition of  (). Therefore, the policy
ine¤ectiveness test statistic can be written as
Td;H =
p
Hd^H(^
0
T )q
!^20q
; (26)
where !20q can be estimated using pre-intervention sample as:
!^20q = s
0
8<:H 1
HX
j=1
AH j

(^0T )

"

^0T

A0H j

(^0T )
9=; s; (27)
where
AH j

(^0T )

= Ikz+1 +(^
0
T ) +
h
(^0T )
i2
+ :::+
h
(^0T )
iH j
(28)
"

^0T

= T 1
T0X
t=M
h
qt  (^0T )qt 1
i h
qt  (^0T )qt 1
i0
; (29)
Under the null hypothesis of policy ine¤ectiveness, and assuming that the underlying RE model
is correctly specied and the innovations "T0+h =  ()uT0+h for h = 1; 2; :::;H are normally
distributed, then for a xed H and as T !1, we have Td;H !d N(0; 1). For moderate values of
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H, small departures from normality of the innovations over the post-intervention sample might
not be that serious for the validity of the test.
Finally, the above derivations abstract from the pre-intervention sampling uncertainty by as-
suming that T is su¢ ciently large and H=T su¢ ciently small. Allowing for the e¤ects of sampling
uncertainty on the distribution of Td;H when dealing with dynamic RE models with complicated
non-linear cross-equation restrictions is likely to be challenging and will not be attempted here.
Alternatively, one could adopt a Bayesian approach and compute the posterior distribution of
d^H(^
0
T ) using Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations.
2.3 Power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test: standard case
The power of Td;H test, dened by (26), depends on the probability limit of Td;H under the
alternative hypothesis that 1 6= 0. In particular, the test is consistent if its power exceeds its
size in nite samples, and if the power tends to unity as H !1. Using (14) and suppressing the
dependence on (^0T ) for simplicity, we note that
p
Hd^H = H
 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h +H
 1=2
HX
h=1
vT0;h: (30)
It is now easily seen that the purely random component, H 1=2
HX
h=1
vT0;h, has a limiting distribution
with mean zero and a nite variance both under the null and the alternative hypotheses. Therefore,
for the test to be consistent the mean component of
p
Hd^H must diverge to innity with H. We
shall consider the limiting behaviour of H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h, which relates to the internal dynamics of
the DSGE model. Under H1 : 1 6= 0, we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h =  s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^0T

 h  1i)qT0
= s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h
 
1
 h  0i)qT0   s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^0T

 h  0i)qT0 :
(31)
But it has been already established that (see (23))
s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^0T

 h  0i)qT0 = Op H 1=2T 1=2+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
:
Hence, under H1
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h = s
0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h
 
1
 h  0i)qT0+Op H 1=2T 1=2+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
:
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Now set 1 = 
 
1

and 0 = 
 
0

, and note that
HX
h=1
h1 = 1(Ikz+1 H1 )(Ikz+1 1) 1.
Under Assumption 2, (Ikz+1  1) 1 exists and is nite and H1 ! 0 as H !1. Hence,
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
 
1

= H 1=21(Ikz+1  H1 )(Ikz+1  1) 1 ! 0, as H !1.
Similarly, H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
 
0
 ! 0, with H, and H 1=2 HX
h=1
^T0;h = op(1), under the alternative
hypothesis. Hence, H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h !p 0 under both the null and the alternative hypotheses as
T and H ! 1, subject to the joint asymptotic condition 1. Therefore, the internal dynamics
of the RE model do not contribute to the power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test for T and H
large. Thus tests based on the average policy e¤ects, d^H , will not be consistent in the case of
stationary DSGE models. In such cases, the best that can be hoped for is to base the test of
the policy ine¤ectiveness on a short post-intervention sample and accept that the test is likely to
lack power and be sensitive to the specications of the post-intervention error processes, "T0+h,
h = 1; 2; :::;H.
3 Policy ine¤ectiveness tests for the RE model with exogenous
variables
3.1 Derivation of the counterfactuals and policy e¤ects with exogenous vari-
ables
We now allow for exogenous policy and non-policy variables. Endogenous policy rules, such as
the Taylor rule, follow closed loop control with feedback, but there may be open loop control
without feedbacks, such as xed money supply rules, where the policy variable xt is exogenous.
There may also be non-policy variables, wt, such as global variables that a¤ect zt and/or yt but
are invariant to changes in xt. This framework also accomodates changes that shift steady states
such as target ination.
As before let qt = (yt; z0t)0, be a (kz + 1)  1 vector, but now introduce st = (xt;w0t)0, a
(1 + kw) 1 vector. The RE model is now
A0qt = A1Et(qt+1) +A2qt 1 +A3st + ut; (32)
and suppose that the forcing variables, st, follow the VAR(1) specication
st = Rst 1 + t; (33)
where
R =

 0
0 Rw

; t =

xt
wt

;
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so that wt is invariant to changes in xt: The errors, ut and t are assumed to be serially and cross
sectionally uncorrelated, with zero means and constant variances, u, and , respectively.
Initially, consider the case where there are no dynamics, namely A2 = 0; and all eigenvalues
of A 10 A1 lie within the unit circle. Then the unique solution of (32) is given by
A0qt = G()st + ut; (34)
where  includes both the structural coe¢ cients, a = vec(A0;A1;A3), and the parameters of the
processes generating the exogenous variables,  = (; vec(Rw)0)0:
vec(G) =

(Ikw+1
Ikz+1) 
 
R0
A1A 10
 1
vec (A3) :
Equation (34) is the structural form of a standard simultaneous equations model. The reduced
form is
qt = A
 1
0 G()st +A
 1
0 ut (35)
=  () st +  ()ut:
Under the same assumptions as before about the intervention at T0, then the process switches
from
qt = A
 1
0 G(
0)st +A
 1
0 ut = 
0st +  ()ut; t =M;M + 1;M + 2; :::; T0;
to
qt = A
 1
0 G(
1)st +A
 1
0 ut = 
1st +  ()ut; t = T0 + 1; T0 + 2; :::; T0 +H:
In the general case where A2 6= 0; the RE solution is
qt =  ()qt 1 +	x ()xt +	w ()wt +  ()ut; (36)
where  contains a = vec(A0;A1;A2;A3) and  = (; vec(Rw)0)0. The counterfactual values of
yT0+h, are now given by
y0T0+h = s
0   0h qT0 + s0 h 1X
j=0


 
0
j 
	x
 
0

x0T0+h j +	w
 
0

wT0+h j

; (37)
where x0T0+j for j = 1; 2; :::;H denote the counterfactual values of the policy variable, and wT0+j ,
for j = 1; 2; :::;H, are the realized values of the policy invariant variables. In the case where
there is a single policy variable that follows the AR(1) process, xt = xt 1 + xt; we also have
x0T0+h =
 
0
h
xT0 . Notice that the counterfactual outcomes are neither ex ante forecasts, since
y0T0+h is computed conditional on the realizations of wT0+h and not their predictions, nor are they
ex post forecasts since they are based on projected values of the policy variables, xT0+h, and the
initial values of the endogenous variables, qT0 .
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3.2 Derivation of the test statistic with exogenous variables
In addition to assumptions 1-3 and the joint asymptotic condition given above we amend assump-
tions 4 and 5 to allow for the exogenous variables.
Assumption 4a: () = (ij()), and 	()= ( ij()); are bounded and continuously di¤er-
entiable in , such that
@ij()=@0, and @ ij()=@0 exist and are bounded, for all i and
j.
Assumption 5a: The initial values, qT0 , and post policy exogenous variables, sT0+j , for
j = 1; 2; :::;H are bounded, namely kqT0k < K; and ksT0+jk < K for all T0 and j, where K is a
xed positive constant.
Using (37), the estimated counterfactuals are
y^0T0+h = s
0
h


^0T
ih
qT0 + s
0
h 1X
j=0
h


^0T
ij h
	x

^0T

x^0T0+h j +	w

^0T

wT0+h j
i
: (38)
As before under Assumption 3, ^0T is
p
T consistent estimator of  based on pre-intervention
period, t = 1; 2; :::; T . In the case of the AR(1) specication for xt we also have x0T0+h = (
0)hxT0 ;
h = 1; 2; :::H; where 0 is the pre-intervention value of , which can be estimated using the
pre-intervention sample, namely
x^0T0+h j =

^0T
h j
xT0 :
Therefore, the estimated policy e¤ects are
d^T0+h = s
0qT0+h s0
h


^0T
ih
qT0 s0
h 1X
j=0
h


^0T
ij h
	x

^0T
 
^0T
h j
xT0 +	w

^0T

wT0+h j
i
;
(39)
for h = 1; 2; :::;H. The dependence of d^T0+h on

^
0
T

has not been made explicit for simplicity.
The null hypothesis of no policy e¤ect is H0 : 1 = 0 and 1 = 0:
The post-intervention realized values, qT0+h, (for h = 1; 2; :::;H) are given by
qT0+h =


 
1
h
qT0 +
h 1X
j=0


 
1
j h
	x
 
1
 
1
h j
xT0 +	w
 
1

wT0+h j
i
+
h 1X
j=0


 
1
j
	x
 
1

T0;h j +
h 1X
j=0


 
1
j
"T0+h j .
where "t = A 10 ut, and
T0;h j =
h jX
i=1

1
h j i
x;T0+i:
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But after some algebra it follows that
h 1X
j=0


 
1
j
	x
 
1

T0;h j =
h 1X
j=0
Bj
 
1; 1

x;T0+h j ; (40)
where
Bj
 
1; 1

=
jX
i=0


 
1
i
	x
 
1
 
1
j i
:
The estimated policy e¤ects are then
d^T0+h =

^qT0;h + ^
w
T0;h + ^
x
T0;h

+

vqT0;h + v
x
T0;h

= ^T0;h + vT0;h:
The terms
^qT0;h =  s0
h


^0T
ih     1hqT0 ;
vqT0;h =
h 1X
j=0
s0


 
1
j
"T0+h j ;
are the same as ^T;h in (15) and vT;h in (16) in section (2.2), without exogenous variables. The
other terms are
^wT0;h =  s0
h 1X
j=0
h


^0T
ij
	w

^0T

    1j	w  1wT0+h j ; (41)
^xT0;h =  s0
h 1X
j=0
h


^0T
ij
	x

^0T
 
^0T
h j     1j	x  1 1h jxT0 ; (42)
and
vxT0;h =
h 1X
j=0
s0Bj
 
1; 1

x;T0+h j : (43)
For a xed H, the implicit null hypothesis of no policy e¤ects can now be specied as
H 00 : p lim
T!1
"
H 1=2
HX
h=1

^qT0;h + ^
w
T0;h + ^
x
T0;h
#
= 0; (44)
which is a generalization of (18). To establish the above result, we consider each of the three
terms in (44), separately. The rst term, relates to the internal dynamics of the DSGE model,
which we already discussed above in Section 2.2, while the next two terms capture the e¤ects of
exogenous variables.
Consider now the second term in (44), and note that (under Assumption 5a)H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h
  K H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
h^0Tij	w ^0T    1j	w  1 : (45)
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But under H0h


^0T
ij
	w

^0T

   1j	w  1 = ^j0	^0;w j0	0;w = ^j0  j0 	^0;w+j0 	^0;w  	0;w ;
where 0 = 
 
0

, ^0 = 

^0T

, 	0;w = 	w
 
0

and 	^0;w = 	w

^0T

. Hence
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
h^0Tij	w ^0T    1j	w  1 (46)

HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
^j0  j0	^0;w+ j0	^0;w  	0;w :
Once again using results in Lemmas 2 and 3 we have
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
^j0  j0	^0;w+ j0	^0;w  	0;w

0@ HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T
1A^0  0	^0;w+
0@ HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
j 1
1A	^0;w  	0;w ; (47)
where  is the upper bound of k0k, and as before T   + aTT 1=2. Once again when H is
xed and T ! 1,
 
HX
h=1
Ph 1
j=0 j
j 1
T
!
and
 
HX
h=1
Ph 1
j=0 
j 1
!
are bounded in T , by Lemma 3
and under Assumption 3,
^0  0 and 	^0;w  	0;w both tend to zero in probability and we
have H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT;h !p 0; as desired. A similar result also obtains for H 1
HX
h=1
^xT;h . Therefore,
for a xed H and under Assumptions 1-3, 4a, 5a, and the null of no policy change, H0, we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1

^qT0;h + ^
w
T0;h + ^
x
T0;h

!p 0, as T !1, for a xed H.
In the case where H rises with T and the rate of increase of H in relation to T is governed by
the joint asymptotic condition 1, in addition to the results above, following (21), we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h = Op

H1=2T 1=2

+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
; under H0:
Therefore, under H0; H 1=2
HX
h=1
^qT0;h and H
 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h, both tend to zero in probability if H =
T , for   1=2; as H and T !1 (the joint asymptotic condition 1). A similar result also holds
for H 1=2
HX
h=1
^xT0;h.
To derive the distribution of the mean e¤ect, d^H ; we use (24) and
1
H
HX
h=1
vxT0;h =
1
H
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0Bj
 
1; 1

x;T0+h j
=
1
H
HX
j=1
s0CH j
 
1; 1

x;T0+j ;
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where CH j
 
1; 1

=
PH j
i=0 Bi
 
1; 1

. Hence, since by assumption xt and "t are serially
uncorrelated and are distributed independently of each other, and considering that under H0,
^T0;H = Op(T
 1=2), we have
V ar
p
Hd^H

= !20q + !
2
0x + o(1);
where
!20q = s
0
24H 1 HX
j=1
AH j (1)"(1)A0H j (1)
35 s;
"(
1) = E("T+j"T+j) and (see also 4))
!20x = 
2
xs
0
24H 1 HX
j=1
CH j
 
1; 1
 CH j  1; 10
35 s:
Therefore, the policy ine¤ectiveness test statistic is given by
Td;H =
p
Hd^Hq
!^20q + !^
2
0x
; (48)
where !20q and !
2
0x are estimated using pre-intervention sample as:
!^20q = s
0
8<:H 1
HX
j=1
AH j

(^0T )

"

^0T

A0H j

(^0T )
9=; s;
where
AH j

(^0T )

= Ikz+1 +(^
0
T ) +
h
(^0T )
i2
+ :::+
h
(^0T )
iH j
"

^0T

= T 1
T0X
t=M
"t

^0T

"0t

^0T

;
"t

^0T

= qt  (^0T )qt 1  	x

^0T

xt  	w

^0T

wt,
!^20x = ^
2
0;xs
0
24H 1 HX
j=1
bCH j bC0H j
35 s; (49)
bCH j = PH ji=0 Bi ^0T ; ^0T, and ^20;x = T 1PT0t=M  xt   ^0Txt 12. Under the null hypothesis
of policy ine¤ectiveness, and assuming that the underlying RE model is correctly specied and
the innovations "T0+h and x;T0+h for h = 1; 2; :::;H are normally distributed, then for a xed
H and as T ! 1, we have Td;H !d N(0; 1). Notice that (48) di¤ers from (26) in the explicit
inclusion of the estimated variance of the exogenous policy variable !^20x: In (26) the variance of
the endogenous policy variable was included in !^20q:
17
3.3 Power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test with exogenous variables
In the numerator of (48)
p
Hd^H = H
 1=2
HX
h=1

^qT0;h + ^
w
T0;h + ^
x
T0;h

+H 1=2
HX
h=1

vqT0;h + v
x
T0;h

:
the purely random component, H 1=2
HX
h=1

vqT0;h + v
x
T0;h

, has a limiting distribution with mean
zero and a nite variance both under the null and the alternative hypotheses. Therefore, for
the test to be consistent the mean component of
p
Hd^H must diverge to innity with H. The
limiting behaviour of H 1=2
HX
h=1
^qT0;h, which relates to the internal dynamics of the DSGE model
is considered above in section (2.3) following (31). The terms H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h, and H
 1=2
HX
h=1
^xT0;h,
capture the e¤ects of exogenous variables. Under H1 : 1 6= 0, we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h =  H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0
n
^j0	^0;w  j1	1;w
o
wT0+h j ; (50)
where 	^0;w = 	w

^0T

, 	1;w = 	w
 
1

, ^0 = 

^0T

, and, 1 = 
 
1

. Also, setting
	0;w = 	w
 
0

we have
^j0	^0;w  j1	1;w =

^j0  j0

	^0;w +
j
0

	^0;w  	0;w

+j0	0;w  j1	1;w; (51)
and we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h =  H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0
h
^j0  j0

	^0;w +
j
0

	^0;w  	0;w
i
wT0+h j
=  H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0

j0	0;w  j1	1;w

wT0+h j :
Noting that under Assumption 5a, kwT0+h jk < K, the rst term of the above is given by
 H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0
h
^j0  j0

	^0;w +
j
0

	^0;w  	0;w
i
wT0+h j
= Op

H1=2T 1=2

+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
and under H1 and the joint asymptotic condition 1 we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h =  H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0
n
j0	0;w  j1	1;w
o
wT0+h j+Op

H1=2T 1=2

+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
(52)
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Now using the result in Lemma 1 we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
j0	0;wwT0+h j = (Ikz+1  0) 1	0;w
0@H 1=2 HX
j=1
wT0+j
1A
  (Ikz+1  0) 1
0@H 1=2 HX
j=1
H j+10 	0;wwT0+j
1A :
But considering that k	0;wk and kwT+jk are bounded in H, and k0k < 1 (under Assumption
2b), then we haveH 1=2
HX
j=1
H j+10 	0;wwT0+j
  H 1=2
HX
j=1
k0kH j+1 k	0;wk kwT0+jk
 K H 1=2
k0k

1  k0kH

(1  k0k) = O

H 1=2

Hence
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^wT0;h =
p
Hs0
h
(Ikz+1  1) 1	1;w   (Ikz+1 0) 1	0;w
i
wT0;H (53)
+Op

H1=2T 1=2

+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
:
Therefore, under H1 : 1 6= 0, the power of the test rises with
p
H if p limH!1 wT0;H 6= 0; and
so long as H = T , with   1=2; as T !1.4 The power of the test also depends on the size of
the di¤erence between the pre and post-intervention long-run e¤ects of the exogenous variables.
Whereas with standard stationary DSGE models the tests based on the average policy e¤ects,
d^H , were not consistent, when there are also exogenous variables the tests are consistent.
4 Simulated policy analysis using a New Keynesian model
To illustrate the issues discussed above we calibrate a standard three equation New Keynesian
DSGE model, using parameter estimates from the literature. We assume that there is no para-
meter or specication uncertainty. We rst consider a model where the variables are all measured
in deviations from their steady states. These are Rt; the interest rate, yt; log real output, and
t; the ination rate. The policy intervention takes place at time T0; with a post-intervention
sample, T0 + 1; T0 + 2; :::; T0 +H: We set out the model; examine the shock and policy impulse
response functions introduced in Section 2.1, and then examine the size and power of the tests
discussed in Section 2.3. In 4.4 we consider a second model where the ination target is changed.
The rst model, where the variables are deviations from steady state is
4The same consideration also apply to the policy variable, xt. In cases where
1 < 1, the policy can only have
short term e¤ects.
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Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R)( t +  yyt) + uRt; (54)
yt = yyt 1 + E(yt+1 jIt )   [Rt   E(t+1 jIt )] + uyt; (55)
t = t 1 + E(t+1 jIt ) + yt + ut; (56)
which can be written more compactly as (1), and repeated here for convenience
A0qt= A1Et(qt+1 jIt )+A2qt 1+ut,
where qt = (Rt; yt; t)0, ut = (uRt; uyt; ut)0; and
A0 =
0@ 1  (1  r) y  (1  r)  1 0
0   1
1A ; A1 =
0@ 0 0 00  
0 0 
1A ; A2 =
0@ R 0 00 y 0
0 0 
1A :
(57)
We also assume that the structural shocks are orthogonal and have the following diagonal covari-
ance matrix
u =
0@ 2uR 0 00 2uy 0
0 0 2u
1A : (58)
As in Section 2.1, the solution of the model is given by (2):
qt= ()qt 1 +  ()ut; (59)
suppressing the dependence on , for the moment, , is the solution of A12 A0+A2 = 0
and  = (A0   A1) 1: The value of  can be solved by iterative back-substitution procedure
which involves iterating on an initial arbitrary choice of  say (0) using the recursive relation
(r) = [Ik (A 10 A1)(r 1)] 1(A 10 A2): (60)
See Binder and Pesaran (1995) for further details. The iterative procedure is continued until
convergence using the criteria k (r)  (r 1) kmax 10 6.
In the numerical calculations all unknown parameters are replaced by calibrated values from
the DSGE literature. Parameters of (56) are calibrated based on average estimates from eight
major economies as summarized in Table 5 of Dees et al (2009). The parameters of (55) and the
long run parameters of the Taylor rule, (54), are calibrated using the results in Dennis (2009).
The calibrated values of 0 are summarized in Table 1 below. The standard deviations of the
errors were all set equal to 0.005, or half a percent per quarter, which is similar to the US values
found in Dees et al. (2009).
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Table 1. Pre-intervention parameter values, 0; used in the Monte Carlo Analysis
 = 0:065  = 0:57  = 0:65  = 0:045   = 1:5  y = 0:5
y = 0:42  = 0:34 R = 0:7 u = 0:005 uy = 0:005 uR = 0:005
The solution matrices for the pre-intervention parameters in (59) are given by:
(0) =
0@ 0:65 0:13 0:20 0:17 0:62  0:05
 0:06 0:08 0:47
1A ;  (0) =
0@ 0:93 0:31 0:60 0:24 1:49  0:15
 0:08 0:19 1:39
1A : (61)
The solution is a VAR(1) and in each equation the coe¢ cient of the autoregressive term is the
largest in absolute value and the persistence of ination is lower than the persistence of output and
interest rates. We also note that even though the structural shocks are orthogonal the reduced
form shocks are correlated.
We consider four separate policy interventions, in which each of the parameters of the Taylor
rule are changed one at a time, leaving the other parameters unchanged. Intervention 1A increases
the interest rate persistence in the Taylor Rule, R; from 0:7 to 0:9: Intervention 1B reduces R
from 0:7 to 0:25: Intervention 1C increases the ination coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule,  , from
1:5 to 2:5. Intervention 1D increases the output coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule,  y, from 0:5 to 1.
The values of 1 that are changed under alternative policy interventions are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Policy interventions
Interventions 0 1
1A R = 0:7 R = 0:9
1B R = 0:7 R = 0:25
1C   = 1:5   = 2:5
1D  y = 0:5  y = 1:0
* The other elements of 1 are kept at their pre-intervention values.
4.1 Shock Impulse Response Functions
As noted above, a shock impulse response function, SIRF, gives the time prole for a shock to one
of the structural errors assuming that the parameters are constant. For example the monetary
policy shock impulse response function represents the e¤ects of a one standard error shock to uRt,
the error in the Taylor rule, and is given by:
SIRFR(h; 
0; uR) = uR


 
0
h
 (0)eR; (62)
where eR= (1; 0; 0)0: For a linear model this SIRF is independent of the value of qT0 , the state of
the economy at the time of the shock. In terms of the SIRF analysis the behaviour of the model
is very standard. As Figure 1 shows a contractionary monetary policy shock raises interest rates
and reduces output and ination, with output falling by more than ination.
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Figure 1: Shock impulse response functions for interest rates, Rt, output, yt, and
ination t
1a. Monetary Policy Shock
1b. Demand Shock
1c. Supply Shock
A positive demand shock increases all three variables; output by the most, then interest rates,
and then ination. A negative supply shock, increases ination, the interest rate rises to o¤set
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the higher ination, but not by as much as ination and output falls. The impact e¤ects of the
monetary policy shock are given by the rst column of  (0) dened by (61), while the impact
e¤ects of the demand and supply shocks are given by its second and third columns.
4.2 Policy Impulse Response Functions
The policy impulse response function, PIRF, gives the response of the system over time to a
permanent change in the policy parameter(s) and, for a particular variable identied by the
selection vector, s; is given by (5), repeated here for convenience:
PIRF (h; 1; 0;qT0) = s
0
h

 
1
h     0hiqT0 : (63)
As noted above, the PIRF requires knowledge of the parameters before and after the intervention
and, as can be seen from (15) and (31) above, it is the PIRF which largely determines the power
of the test to determine whether the mean e¤ect of the policy is di¤erent from zero.
Unlike SIRFs, the PIRFs and the policy ine¤ectiveness tests depend on the chose of initial
states, qT0 , at the time of the policy change. It is therefore important that the choice of qT0reects
a sensible combination of values of interest rate, ination and output. One possible approach is
to set qT0 equal to the impact e¤ects of SIRFs. For example, one could set qT0 to qR;T0 =
uR (
0)eR; which is the impact e¤ect of a monetary policy shock as given by (62) for h = 0.
Similarly, for the demand and supply shocks qT0 can be set to qy;T0 = u y (
0)ey and q;T0 =
u (
0)e, respectively, where ey = (0; 1; 0)0 and e = (0; 0; 1)0.5 Considering values of the
initial states, qT0 , that correspond to impact e¤ects of structural shocks seems sensible given
the focus of the literature on SIRFs. One could also consider multiples of the e¤ects of such
shocks as representing di¤erent degrees of deviations from equilibrium. The power of the policy
ine¤ectiveness test will then be an increasing function of the extent to which, at the time of the
policy change, the economy has deviated from the equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows PIRFs for the e¤ects of changing the degree of persistence (or the interest rate
smoothing) associated with the Taylor rule, Figure 2a shows the e¤ect of intervention 1A and
Figure 2b of 1B. These are the only policy changes which have much e¤ect. This is consistent
with the theoretical results that it is the dynamics that are central to policy having mean e¤ects.
We set the initial states at qR;T0 = uR (
0)eR; the values of the variables that result from
the monetary policy shock on impact. Intervention 1A increases the degree of persistence from
R = 0:7; to R = 0:9: This causes the interest rate to rise and output and ination to fall initially,
with a maximum e¤ect after about three periods before returning to zero. Intervention 1B reduces
the degree of persistence from R = 0:7; to R = 0:25: This has the opposite e¤ect causing the
5As noted above these values are given by the columns of  (0) dened by (61).
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interest rate to fall, by more than it rose in case 1A; and output and ination to rise by rather less
than they fell under case 1A. The initial e¤ects are the same as the values of


 
1
   0 for
the two cases. When the degree of persistence is low as in intervention 1B, the variables return to
zero much faster, making the mean e¤ect of policy much smaller. As we shall see, this is reected
in the power of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests to be discussed below.
Figure 2: Policy Impulse Response Functions: qR;T0 = uR (
0)eR.
2a. Intervention 1A : R = 0:7; to R = 0:9
2b. Intervention 1B : R = 0:7; to R = 0:25
4.3 Policy Ine¤ectiveness tests
The test performance was evaluated using the calibrated values of 0 ignoring estimation error
and for various settings of the initial states, qT0 . Values of qT0+h; h = 1; 2; :::;H; for horizons
H = 8; and H = 24: are generated from (59) assuming u(b)t s IIDN(0;u); where u is given
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in (58) for b = 1; 2; ::; 2000; replications.6 For replication b the policy e¤ects are simulated as
d^
(b)
T0+h
= q
(b)
T0+h
    0h qT0 ; (64)
for h = 1; 2; :::;H. The policy mean e¤ect is calculated as
d^
(b)
H =
1
H
HX
h=1
d^
(b)
T0+h
;
and the test statistic as
T (b)d;H =
p
Hd^
(b)
H
!^0q
;
where
!^20q =
8<:H 1
HX
j=1
AH j
 
(0)

"
 
0
A0H j  (0)
9=; ;
AH j
 
(0)

= Ikz+1 +(
0) +

(0)
2
+ :::+

(0)
H j
:
Table 3 shows the size and power of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests against four alternative
policy interventions, two evaluation horizons and three initial states. The size was calculated
when q(b)T0+h was generated using 
0; the power was calculated when q(b)T0+h was generated using
one of the four alternative policy interventions which change 0 to 1A; :::; 1D, as set out in Table
2. The initial states are given in di¤erent rows of the Table. The rows labelled qR;T0 give the
rejection frequencies for the initial state corresponding to the e¤ects of a one standard deviation
monetary policy shock, ; the rows labelled qy;T0 a demand shock and and the rows labelled q;T0
a a supply shock.
The size seems very well controlled. The power is highest for intervention, 1A, where the
degree of persistence of the Taylor rule increases from R = 0:7; to R = 0:9; conrming what was
apparent from the PIRFs. However, even in this case the power is not high. At H = 8 the highest
power is 20% for testing the e¤ect on yt and using the initial state, qR;T0 or q;T0 : At H = 24
the highest power is 25% for testing the e¤ect on yt. The test has little power against the other
three types of interventions.7 Whereas the test has power against the increase in persistence of
the Taylor rule it has less power against the reduction in the persistence of the Taylor rule for
output and ination because the variables return to zero quickly. The test has little power against
changes in the coe¢ cients of ination and output in the Taylor rule because they have relatively
little e¤ect on the other variables on impact.
6More specically, q(b)T0+h= ()q
(b)
T0+h 1 +  ()u
(b)
T0+h
, for h = 1; 2; :::; H, with q(b)T0 = qT0 .
7Similar outcomes are also reported by Rudebusch (2005) who, in the context of the Lucas Critique, shows that
the apparent policy invariance of reduced forms is consistent with the magnitude of historical policy shifts and the
relative insensitivity of the reduced forms of plausible forward looking macroeconomic specications to policy shifts.
However, here we use formal tests based on structural models.
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Table 3: Size, 0, and power of policy ine¤ectiveness tests
against 4 alternatives 1A; 1B; 1C ; 1D ; horizons H = 8; 24; 3 initial states
Size (0) Power (1A) Power (1B) Power (1C) Power (1D)
R y  R y  R y  R y  R y 
H = 8
qR;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.07
qy;T0 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06
q;T0 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06
H = 24
qR;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07
qy;T0 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06
q;T0 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06
Notes: The rows labelled qR;T0 set the initial state qT0 = uR (
0)eR. Similarly for qy;T0 = uy (
0)ey, and
q;T0 = u (
0)e. The alternative hypotheses are set out in Table 2.
Figure 3 shows the rejection frequency for intervention 1A, increasing the degree of interest
rate smoothing, against the impact of a k standard deviation monetary policy shock, qR;T0 . The
rejection frequencies increase with the deviation of the initial value from zero and are roughly
symmetric for positive and negative values. The rejection frequencies are highest for output,
intermediate for ination and lowest for interest rates. The graphs were similar but with lower
rejection frequencies when the initial states are set to multiples of demand and supply shocks.
Figure 3. Rejection frequencies for intervention 1A (increasing R from 0:7 to 0:9)
with the initial states at k standard deviations of qR;T0, and H = 8 quarters
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These simulations conrm the theoretical results. The size of the test is correct. The e¤ect of
the policy intervention depends on the dynamics, reductions in the degree of persistence reduce
the e¤ect of changing the policy parameters. The power of the test depends on the state of the
economy at the time of the policy intervention. In our example, the test has some power against
increases in the persistence of the Taylor rule, but not against the other policy changes considered.
However, the e¤ects of all these policy changes are transitory, none have any e¤ect on the steady
states. We now consider interventions that change the steady states.
4.4 Ination targeting as a policy change
As an example of a policy intervention that changes the steady states, consider an ination
targeting regime when the policy maker changes the target rate of ination which we denote
by . We assume the announcement of the change in the ination target is credible and fully
understood.8 To represent this intervention in the New Keynesian example, where the variables
are measured as deviations from steady state, we need to re-write the ination and interest rate
deviations in terms of their realized values which we denote by t and Rt; namely t = t + 
and Rt = Rt   (r + ); where  is the target rate of ination, and r denotes the steady state
value of the real interest rate. In terms of the realized values of ination and interest rates, t
and Rt; and deviations yt; for the output gap, we have
Rt = (1  R) [r + (1   )] + RRt 1 + (1  R)( t +  yyt) + uRt
yt =  r + yyt 1 + E(yt+1 jIt )  
h
Rt   E(t+1 jIt )
i
+ uyt
t = (1     ) + t 1 + E(t+1 jIt ) + yt + ut:
and settingqt = (Rt; yt;t)0, we obtain
A0qt = A1Et(qt+1) +A2qt 1 +A3st + ut;
which corresponds to the RE model (32) with exogenous variables, with st replaced by 1, and
A3 =
0@ (1  R) [r + (1   )] r
(1     )
1A :
The other matrices, A0, A1, and A2; are given as before by (57). The solution in terms ofqt is
given by
qt = [I3  ()]q +()qt 1 +  ()ut;
8Kulish and Pagan (2014) consider a change in ination target when there is both perfect and imperfect credi-
bility.
27
whereq = (r+ ; 0; )0, and () and  () are dened as before. This solution can be viewed
as an example of the model with policy invariant variables discussed in Section 3 where in the
solution (36), 	x ()xt is set to zero and 	w ()wt is set to [I3  ()]q.
Suppose now that the policy intervention at time T0 took the form of changing the ination
target from 0 to 1. In this case the policy e¤ects are given by (39) with 	w ()wt replaced by
[I3  ()]q, namely
d^T0+h = s
0qT0+h   s0
h


^0T
ih
qT0   s0
h 1X
j=0
h


^0T
ij h
I3  

^0T
i
q0;
whereq0 = (r + 0; 0; 0)0
d^T0+h = s
0qT0+h   s0
h


^0T
ih
qT0   s0

I3  
h


^0T
ih
q0; (65)
The policy ine¤ectiveness test is given by (48), noting that there are no policy exogenous variables,
xt, in this example. In the case where only the ination target is changed the power of the test
rises with
p
Hs0
 
q1  q0

=
p
H
 
1   0

(1; 0; 1)0s, and tends to unity in the case of ination
and the nominal interest rate, as to be expected, and has no power as H ! 1, if real output
deviations, yt, are considered. Nevertheless, the change in the ination target does have short
run e¤ects on real output. This is reected in the policy impulse response function and the test
outcomes. The policy impulse response function when only the ination taget is changed is given
by
PIRF (h; 1   0; ) =
 
1   0
n
I3   [ ()]h
o0@ 10
1
1A ; for h = 1; 2; :::;H: (66)
It is clear that in the limit as H !1, the PIRF tends to  1   0 (1; 0; 1)0, which also conrms
that in the NK model only nominal values are a¤ected in the long run by changes in the ination
target.
The short run impacts of changes in the ination target can be illustrated using the para-
metrization given above. For this purpose we consider two scenarios, a reduction of 0 from 2%
to 1% per quarter and an increase of 0 from 1% to 2% per quarter. The increase in the target
ination is interesting in the context of the Japanese experience. Initially we do not change any
of the other policy parameters, which are kept at the baseline values listed in Table 1. Figure
4a gives the responses to the reduction and 4b to the increase in the ination target. In the case
of a reduction, ination falls more than the interest rate, raising the real interest rate on impact
to 0.44% and thus depressing output. The real interest rate and output return to zero, leaving
the nominal interest rate and ination rate at the new target 1% lower after about seven quar-
ters. When the target rate of ination is increased the e¤ects are reversed: ination jumps more
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than interest rates, the real interest rate falls on impact to -0.44%, temporarily raising output.
Although the two cases are symmetrical numerically, they are not symmetrical in welfare terms,
since the output loss associated with the reduction in ination is something that one would wish
to avoid.
Figure 4: Policy impulse response functions for changes in target rates of ination
4a. Reduction of 0 = 2% to 1 = 1% per quarter
4b. Increase of 0 = 1% to 1 = 2% per quarter
In the case where there is both a change in the steady state and a change in the policy rule
parameters, the policy impulse response functions are given by
PIRF (h; 1; 
1; 0; 
0) =
h

 
1
h     0hiqT0 + nI3     1hoq1   nI3     0hoq0;
=
n

 
1
h     0ho qT0  q0+ I3    1h  q1  q0
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where
q0 =
0@ r + 00
0
1A ;q1  q0 =  1   0
0@ 10
1
1A :
More specically, for a unit MP shock at the point of intervention, we setqT0 = q
0+uR (^0T )eR,
and hence
PIRF (h; 1; 
1; 0; 
0) = uR
n

 
1
h     0ho (0)eR (67)
+
 
1   0
 
I3  
 
1
h0@ 10
1
1A :
which reduces to (66) when only the ination target is changed. Similar expressions can be
obtained when the initial state is set to values ofq that arise on impact from demand or supply
shocks.
We now consider combining the change in the ination target with changes in the degree of
ination smoothing. Figure 5a presents the e¤ects of simultaneously reducing the ination target
from 2% to 1% and increasing the ination smoothing parameter, R, from 0:7 to 0:9, intervention
1A above, with the initial state set toqR;T0 . This intervention causes ination to drop sharply,
overshooting its steady state of 1%, hitting 1.55% after about 4 quarters. The real interest rate
rises to 1.25%, depressing output, before the variables return to their steady state. Figure 5b
shows that increasing the target rate of ination has similar but the opposite e¤ects. Comparing
the reduction in the target rate of ination in Figure 5a with that in Figure 4a, the increased
interest rate smoothing has resulted in a much larger loss of output. Whereas in Figure 4a the
maximum loss of output was 0.3% per quarter, in gure 5a the maximum loss was 1.1%, in both
cases around quarter 3.
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Figure 5: Policy impulse response functions for changes in target rates of ination
plus increased interest rate smoothing
Intervention 1A : R from 0:7 to 0:9, initial stateqR;T0
5a. Reduction of 0 = 2% to 1 = 1% per quarter
5b. Increase of 0 = 1% to 1 = 2% per quarter
Figure 6 shows the results when the change in ination target is combined with reduced
interest rate smoothing. For a credible reduction in the ination target and very little interest
rate smoothing, the interest rate and the ination rate reduce by almost exactly the same amount
and output hardly falls. With a credible increase in the ination target and reduced interest rate
smoothing, ination increases more than interest rates and the lower real interest rates provides
a boost to output. While the results are specic to this parameterisation and the assumption of
credibility, it seems likely that less interest rate smoothing is optimal when reducing the target rate
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of ination, as in Figure 6a, since this causes less output loss, and more interest rate smoothing
seems more appropriate when increasing the target rate of ination, as in the Japanese case, since
this provides a bigger boost to output.
Figure 6: Policy impulse response functions for changes in target rates of ination
plus reduced interest rate smoothing
Intervention 1B : R from 0:7 to 0:25, initial stateqR;T0
6a. Reduction of 0 = 2% to 1 = 1% per quarter
6b. Increase of 0 = 1% to 1 = 2% per quarter
We now consider the e¤ect on size and power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test in detecting the
e¤ects of changes in the target rate of ination on ination, output deviations and the interest
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rate. We only consider the case where the ination target is reduced from 2% to 1% per quarter,
the results for an increase were almost identical. We consider two interventions. In the rst, called
1E ; the interest rate smoothing parameter is left unchanged at R = 0:7, in the second, called
1F ; R is increased to 0:9 at the same time as the reduction in the ination target is announced.
If the target rate is reduced without any other policy changes, the power of the tests based on the
nominal interest rate and the ination rate are quite high and rise substantially as the horizon
of the test is increased from H = 8 to 24 quarters. In contrast, and as to be expected noting
the PIRFs depicted in Figure 4, the test has little power for output, since the e¤ect of a change
in the ination target on the real output is small and transitory. Under intervention 1F ; when
there is both a change in the ination target and an increase in interest rate smoothing, the power
of the test based on ination outcomes is increased, but for interest rates the power is reduced
relative to the case 1E ; since the increased smoothing means that interest rates do not change as
much. The increased smoothing causes a larger movement in real interest rates as noted above
and this causes a greater e¤ect on output hence a higher power in detecting the e¤ects of the
policy change on realized values of output deviations. Whereas for interest rates and ination,
the power increases as the horizon is extended, for output deviations, which is moving back to its
steady state value of zero, the power falls as the horizon is extended.
Table 4: Size and power of policy ine¤ectiveness tests against reducing the ination
target only (1E) and when ination target reduction is accompanied by a rise in
interest rate smoothing (1F )- Horizons H = 8; 24; 3 initial states (qT0)
Size (0) Power (1E) Power (1F )
R y  R y  R y 
Initial states H = 8
qR;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.72 0.13 0.39 0.90
qy;T0 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.07 0.68 0.17 0.33 0.86
q;T0 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.70 0.16 0.35 0.88
H = 24
qR;T0 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.73 0.07 0.99 0.65 0.30 0.98
qy;T0 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.99 0.70 0.28 0.98
q;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.99 0.68 0.29 0.99
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Alternative hypothesis 1E assumes that the ination target is reduced from
0 = 2% to 
1
 = 1% per quarter. Alternative hypothesis 
1F combines the reduction of the ination target from
0 = 2% to 
1
 = 1% per quarter with a higher degree of interest rate smoothing, raising R from 0:7 to 0:9.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have derived tests for the null hypothesis of the ine¤ectiveness of a policy
intervention, dened as a change in the parameters of a policy rule. We consider tests conducted
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using full structural models both of the standard form, where all the variables including the policy
variable are endogenous, as well as where the system is augmented with exogenous variables,
including, perhaps, exogenous policy variables. The augmented system allows us to consider
policy interventions that change steady states, such as changes in the ination target.
The tests are based on the average di¤erences, over a given policy evaluation horizon, between
the post-intervention realizations of the target variable and the associated counterfactual outcomes
based on the parameters estimated using data before the policy intervention. The Lucas Critique
is not an issue since the counterfactual, given by the predictions from the model estimated on
pre-intervention data, will embody pre-intervention parameters, while the actual post-intervention
outcomes will embody any e¤ect of the change in policy, the change in parameters and the conse-
quent change in expectations. The tests do not require knowing the post-intervention parameters.
We derive the asymptotic distribution of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests under alternative
assumptions concerning the type of model, the future error processes and the pre and post-
intervention sample sizes. The power of the proposed tests depends on the size of the parameter
change, the dynamics of the system, the state of the economy at the time of the intervention, the
size of the policy evaluation horizon and whether the model contains policy invariant exogenous
variables. However, the power of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests are likely to be low unless the
underlying DSGE model contains exogenous variables, or equivalently the policy changes the
steady states.
The size and power of the proposed tests are investigated by simulations using a standard
three equation New Keynesian DSGE model. These simulations are in accord with the theoretical
results. The size of the test is correct, and the tests have power against increases in the persistence
of the Taylor rule, but little power against increases in the responses of interest rates to ination
and output. The test does have power against policy interventions that change steady states, such
as changes in the target rate of ination which has a permanent e¤ect on ination and interest
rates but only a transitory e¤ect on output, which eventually returns to its steady state.
The focus of this paper has been on the mean e¤ects of policy changes. But, as mentioned at
the end of Section 2.1, the volatility e¤ects of policy change are also of interest. In that simple
case, where there are no dynamics and no exogenous variables, the variance of qt changes following
the policy intervention from "(0) =  (0)u (0)0 to "(1) =  (1)u (1)0, assuming that
u remains constant. However, in many cases, such as the Great Moderation, the central issue is
whether the reduction in the variance of output growth is due to good policy (changes in policy
parameters p) or good luck (reductions in kuk). The same issues arise when there is dynamics.
In the case where the model include exogenous variables, the variance of qt can be derived from
the RE solution for qt given by equation (36). In this case there is an extra contribution to
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the change in the variance of qt after the policy intervention that comes from any change in
the variance of the non-policy exogenous variables. An interesting subject for future research
is the decomposition of the change in the variance of qt into components due to the change in
policy parameters, the change in non-policy innovation variances and the change in the variance
of the exogenous variables. Unlike the policy ine¤ectiveness test, such a decomposition requires
estimating the parameters of a full structural model before as well as after the intervention.
Appendix: Statement and Proof of Lemmas
Lemma 1 Let A be a kk matrix and xT+h j a k1 vector, and suppose that Ik A is invertible,
then
H 1
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
AjxT+h j = H 1
HX
j=1
 
Ik+A+ :::+A
H jxT+j
= H 1 (Ik A) 1
HX
j=1
 
Ik  AH j+1

xT+j
= (Ik A) 1
0@H 1 HX
j=1
xT+j
1A  (Ik A) 1
0@H 1 HX
j=1
AH j+1xT+j
1A :
Proof. The result follows by direct manipulation of the terms.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the k  k matrices A and B have bounded spectral norms kAk   and
kBk  , for some xed positive constant . ThenAh  Bh  hh 1 kA Bk ; for h = 1; 2; :::: (68)
Proof. We establish this result by backward induction. It is clear that it holds for h = 1. For
h = 2, using the identity
A2  B2 = A(A B) + (A B)B;
the result for h = 2 follows
A2  B2  (kAk+ kBk) kA Bk = 2 kA Bk :
More generally, we have the identity
Ah  Bh = Ah(A B) + (A B)Bh +A(Ah 2  Bh 2)B:
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Now suppose now that (68) holds for h  2, and using the above note thatAh  Bh  Ah 1 kA Bk+ kA BkBh 1+ kAkAh 2  Bh 2 kBk
 kAkh 1 kA Bk+ kA Bk kBkh 1 + kAk
Ah 2  Bh 2 kBk
 2h 1 kA Bk+ 2
Ah 2  Bh 2
 2h 1 kA Bk+ 2
h
(h  2)h 3 kA Bk
i
 hh 1 kA Bk :
Hence, if (68) holds for h   2; then it must also hold for h. But since we have established that
(68) holds for h = 1 and h = 2, then it must hold for any h.
Lemma 3 Consider the k  k matrix A() = (aij()), where k is a nite integer and aij(),
for all i; j = 1; 2; ::; k; are continuously di¤erentiable real-valued functions of the p  1 vector of
parameters,  2 . Suppose that aij() has nite rst order derivatives at all points in , and
assume that ^T is a
p
T consistent estimator of 0. ThenA(^T ) A(0)  aT ^T   0 ; (69)A(^T )  A(0)+ aT ^T   0 ; (70)
where aT =
@A  T  =@0 is bounded in T , and elements of T2  lie on the line segment
joining 0 and ^T
Proof. Consider the mean-value expansions
aij

^T

  aij
 
0

=
@aij
 
T

@0

^T   0

; for i; j = 1; 2; :::; k;
where elements of T lie on the line segment joining 0 and ^T . Given that ^T is consistent for
0, it must also be that T !p 0; as T !1. Collecting all the k2 terms we have
A(^T ) A(0) =
 
@A
 
T

@0
!h
Ik 


^T   0
i
;
where 
 denotes the Kronecker matrix product. HenceA(^T ) A(0) 
@A
 
T

@0
^T   0 ;
A(^T ) =
A(0) +
 
@A
 
T

@0
!h
Ik 


^T   0
i  A(0)+
@A
 
T

@0
^T   0 :
The results (69) and (70) now follow since T !p 0, and by assumption the derivatives @aij
 
0

=@0
exist and are bounded in T .
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Lemma 4 Suppose that T = + T 1=2aT , aT > 0 and bounded in T , T 6= 1, H = T , where
  1=2, 0 <  < 1, and  is a positive xed constant. Then
HX
h=1
hh 1T =
1
(1  )2 +Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

; (71)
and
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T =
1
(1  )2

H   1 + 
1  

+Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

: (72)
Proof. We rst note that
HX
h=1
hh 1T =
@
@T
 
HX
h=1
hT
!
=
1  HT
(1  T )2
  H
H
T
(1  T ) ; (73)
Also since T = +Op
 
T 1=2

HX
h=1
hh 1T =
1
(1  )2 +Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HHT

: (74)
But,
HT =

+ T 1=2aT
H
= H
 
1 +
T 1=2aT

!H
= Op

HedTH=
p
T

; (75)
where dT = aT =, which is also bounded in T . Finally, H=
p
T = T 1 =2 and for   1=2, edTH=
p
T
will be bounded in T . Using this result in (74) yields (71), as desired. Similarly,
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T =
HX
h=1
" 
1  hT
  h(1  T )h 1T
(1  T )2
#
=
1
(1  T )2
"
HX
h=1
h
1  hT

  h(1  T )h 1T
i#
=
1
(1  T )2
"
H  
HX
h=1
hT   (1  T )
HX
h=1
hh 1T
#
:
Using (73) we have
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T =
1
(1  T )2
(
H   T   
H+1
T
1  T   (1  T )

1  HT
(1  T )2
  H
H
T
(1  T )
)
:
Now using (75) and recalling that T = +Op
 
T 1=2

, we obtain (72).
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